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Abstract: This paper reconsiders the ‘curse of resources’ hypothesis for
the case of China, and distinguishes between resource abundance, resource
rents, and resource dependence. Resource abundance and resource rents are
shown to be approximately equivalent, and their association with resource
dependence varies with institutional quality. Resource abundance/rents has
a positive impact on economic growth, while resource dependence has a neg-
ative impact. The impact of the ‘West China Development Drive’ policy,
started in 2000, is substantial, and this is investigated through a compara-
tive analysis based on cross-section samples, and through a panel-data time-
varying coeﬃcient approach for West and East provinces. Resource eﬀects
do change after the policy shock.
JEL Classiﬁcation: O11, O13, O53, C21, Q0, Q33.
Keywords: Natural resource curse; Economic growth; China; Institutional
quality; Resource abundance; Resource dependence; Regional diﬀerences;
Policy change.
21 Introduction
The question whether economic growth depends on resource abundance, and
if so how, has been much debated in the literature. After Habakkuk (1962)
and Murphy et al. (1989) claimed that growth depends on resource abun-
dance, Sachs and Warner (1995) showed that resource abundance can also
lead to poor economic performance: the ‘curse of resources’ hypothesis. The
curse can be due to the fact that non-resource sectors are crowded out by
overdevelopment of resource sectors (‘Dutch disease’, see Sachs and Warner,
1999), or can be explained by a rent-seeking argument (Tornell and Lane,
1999; Baland and Francois, 2000). Others have noted, however, that not all
countries with abundant resources are cursed, for example Canada, Australia,
Norway, and Botswana, and they suggest that the principal force underlying
the divergent performance of resource-rich countries is institutional (Mehlum
et al., 2006; Sokoloﬀ and Engerman, 2000).
Recently, Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) discussed how resources are
measured and how this might aﬀect the analysis. A common measure is
the ratio of resource exports to GDP, and Brunnschweiler and Bulte argued
that this is a measure of resource dependence rather than of resource abun-
dance. Such a measure is likely to be endogenous with institutional quality
and economy size, resulting in an endogeneity problem. To avoid this prob-
lem, Brunnschweiler and Bulte introduced an exogenous measure of resource
abundance, and investigated the resource eﬀects by controlling for both re-
source abundance and resource dependence in growth regressions. Their
across-country empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that resource de-
pendence is endogenously inﬂuenced by institutional quality. In addition,
they found that instead of cursing the economy, resource abundance is good
for institutional quality as well as for growth, while resource dependence has
a negative but weak correlation with growth after controlling for abundance.
Since resource abundance and resource dependence have opposite im-
pacts on economic growth, it is of interest to know when the positive eﬀects
of resource abundance/rents dominate and when the negative eﬀects. Is is
also unclear whether abundant resources always lead to strong resource de-
pendence. If not, under what conditions does weak resource dependence
occur in resource-abundant regions? These questions are relevant because,
if conditions for positive net resource eﬀects are known and controllable,
then resource-abundant but underdeveloped regions can make proper use of
rich resources to stimulate their economies. Similarly, if conditions for less
resource dependence are known, resource-abundant regions can adjust and
become less resource-dependent.
Most studies on resource eﬀects employ cross-section data to study the
3long-run eﬀects of resources (e.g., Sachs and Warner (1999); Mehlum et al.
(2006); Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008)). Using cross-section data reduces
the possible bias caused by economic ﬂuctuations, but it does not capture the
dynamics. A cross-section analysis of resource eﬀects assumes implicitly that
these eﬀects do not change over time. This may, however, not be the case,
especially for regions in transition. For such regions, structural breaks may
occur, and resources may play a diﬀerent role before and after the breaks.
This paper attempts to pay attention to all these issues. We examine
the resource eﬀects in China, based on data from 28 provinces. There are
several advantages of using within-country data. First, diﬀerent countries
can be very heterogeneous, and many relevant variables are hard to control,
thus leading to omitted-variable and attenuation bias. A within-country
study does not have this problem, at least not in the same degree. States or
provinces in one country will have a lot in common, and therefore a within-
country study allows a sharper focus on the resource eﬀects and will provide
more precise estimates. Second, within-country data allow us to study the
dynamic eﬀects of resources in the presence of structure breaks. If we focus
on one country, it is easier to specify a common structural break, such as a
policy change or a signiﬁcant event.
While many studies compare diﬀerent countries, there are only a few
within-country studies on the resource curse. An important within-country
study is Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007), which employed data from 49 states
in the USA, and concluded that resource-scarce states outperform resource-
rich states. In China there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between provincial
economies, and substantial variation in the importance of resource sectors.
The Eastern provinces of China are generally more developed than the West-
ern provinces. Since most Western provinces are resource-abundant, natu-
rally the question arises which role resource abundance plays in determining
the economic development of a province in China. Of special interest is a
signiﬁcant policy change, which occurred in 2000 when the government pro-
posed the ‘West China Development Drive’, a policy initiative designed to
promote the economies of Western provinces by intensifying natural resource
exploitation, improving infrastructure, and opening up the region. This was
a big change of policy, and natural resources may play a diﬀerent role in the
economy before and after 2000.
There is only a small literature on the relationship between resources and
the economy in China. Xu and Wang (2006) used panel-data methods and
found evidence supporting the hypothesis of a resource curse at the provincial
level. Zhang et al. (2008) employed the energy resource production in 1985 as
a measure of resource abundance, and associated a poor economy with rich
resources, especially in rural regions. Neither of these two papers studies
4the eﬀects of the 2000 policy change. In contrast, Shao and Qi (2009) com-
pared the resource eﬀects before and after the policy change by estimating
two samples (before and after the shock) separately. Their results suggest
that the West China Development Drive induced a resource curse and lead
to an increased gap between East and West China. One problem with all
three papers is the measurement of resource abundance. For example, Xu
and Wang (2006) measured resource abundance by the proportion of mining
workers or by the ratio of investment in the mining industry to total ﬁxed
asset investment, while Shao and Qi (2009) used the ratio of output in the
resource industry to gross industrial output value. Such resource dependence
measures suﬀer from endogeneity, thus resulting in inconsistent estimates.
To improve the accuracy of estimators and investigate the resource ef-
fects more precisely, we follow Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) and consider
both resource abundance and resource dependence. Moreover, we distinguish
between resource abundance and resource rents. Resource abundance is de-
ﬁned as the stock measure of resource wealth, while resource rents mainly
concern the ﬂow of income from resource extraction at speciﬁc points in time.
Rich resources do not necessarily imply large resource rents, and hence we
distinguish between abundance and rents when examining resource eﬀects
on economic growth. Another important variable is institutional quality.
It is widely accepted that institutional quality plays an important role in
the economy. But measuring institutional quality has proved diﬃcult. We
propose to use the conﬁdence in courts as a proxy for institutional quality.
Provincial-level data are used both from East and West China. To solve the
endogeneity problem, instrumental variables for both resource dependence
and institutional quality will considered, and (consistent) 2SLS and 3SLS
estimates will be reported and compared with the OLS estimates.
Our paper uses both cross-section and time-series data. The advantage
of using cross-section data is that it better captures the long-run eﬀect, and
reduces the possible bias caused by economic ﬂuctuations. A functional-
coeﬃcient model is employed to describe the association between resource
abundance/rents and resource dependence across institutional levels. In or-
der to see whether natural resources play a diﬀerent role before and after
the 2000 policy change, we compare pre-shock and post-shock samples. Re-
gional diﬀerences between Eastern (coastal) provinces and Western (inland)
provinces regarding institutional quality, social structure, and other factors,
are taken into account. The advantage of time-series data is that it provides
a perspective of how resource impacts on the economy change over time.
Estimating a time-varying coeﬃcient model in a panel-data framework, we
beneﬁt from the larger sample size of panel data, and obtain insights in the
dynamics of the resource eﬀects.
5Our results are not in general agreement with the current literature, and
they conﬁrm the results in Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) to a large extent.
We ﬁnd that both resource abundance and resource dependence are highly
associated with institutional quality, which shows that resource dependence
is an endogenous variable that needs to be instrumented. Although resource
abundance/rents and resource dependence are strongly correlated, abundant
resource does not necessarily lead to high resource dependence. This is where
institutional quality plays a crucial role. The functional-coeﬃcient estimates
show that richness in resources results in high dependence in regions where
institutional quality is extreme (either very low or very high), and low de-
pendence in regions where institutional quality is moderate, even when these
regions are resource-abundant. Resource abundance and resource depen-
dence have an opposite eﬀect on economic growth. Instead of cursing the
economy, abundant resources have a positive inﬂuence on economic growth,
while overdependence on resources is bad for growth. The resource eﬀects
on growth also varies across institutional quality. The West China Develop-
ment Drive had an important impact on the role of resources in the economy,
by intensifying resource exploitation of the Western provinces, resulting in
an increase in income in the West. This increased income helped the econ-
omy for a short period, but did not last long. An overemphasis on resource
exploitation crowded out activities in other sectors such as education and
entrepreneurship, and it did not much to boost resource-related sectors such
as industrialization. Thus, the positive eﬀect of resource rents slowed down
and even became negative.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we propose the models.
The data are described in Section 3, where we also present some characteris-
tics and preliminary analysis of the data. In Sections 4–6 we estimate cross-
section models using the entire sample, and also provide before- and after-
2000 analysis using two separate samples. Section 7 uses the time-varying
coeﬃcient model and presents the resulting estimates. Some conclusions are
oﬀered in Section 8.
2 Benchmark models
We now present the models which we shall use to study the resource eﬀects
on economic growth. As also noted by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008),
the typically used resource measure is based on resource dependence, and
this may be aﬀected by either resource abundance or institutional quality or
both, so that it fails to serve as an appropriate exogenous variable. Hence,
we distinguish between resource abundance and resource dependence. Re-
6source abundance may exert a direct inﬂuence on economic growth, while it
also aﬀects the economy indirectly through institutional quality and resource
dependence. It will also be useful to distinguish between resource abundance
and resource rents when examining the impacts of resource on growth. Re-
source abundance is a stock measure of in situ resource wealth, while resource
rents measure the ﬂow of income from extracting resource stock at some point
in time. Although the two concepts are likely to be highly correlated, we can-
not rule out the possibility that some regions are rich in resource, but still
their income does not depend primarily on resource exploitation. Because of
this concern, we distinguish between resource abundance and resource rents
in our analysis.
In order to examine relations between resource abundance/rents, resource
dependence, and institutional quality in China, we follow the framework of
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), and consider the regression model
INS = β0a + β1aRA + β2aRD + β3aWEST + ǫ1a, (1)
INS = β0r + β1rRR + β2rRD + β3rWEST + ǫ1r, (2)
where INS represents institutional quality, RA is resource abundance, RR
is resource rents, RD is resource dependence, and WEST is a geographic
dummy variable indicating the Western provinces, that is, WEST = 1 if the
province lies in the West region of China and WEST = 0 otherwise. The
subscripts ‘a’ and ‘r’ diﬀerentiate whether RA or RR is used in the regres-
sions. The aim of Equations (1) and (2) is to examine the dependence of
institutional quality on resource abundance when we control for geography
and resource dependence. Resource abundance and rents are the main focus,
since a negative coeﬃcient of β1a or β1r provides new evidence supporting a
rent-seeking theory, while a positive coeﬃcient would support Brunnschweiler
and Bulte’s (2008) argument that resource abundance and institutional qual-
ity are positively linked, probably through an income eﬀect. We add the West
dummy as a control because there is non-negligible diﬀerence of institutional
quality between Eastern and Western regions.
In order to examine the exogeneity of resource dependence, we study the
determinants of resource dependence and consider the following model:
RD = α0a + α1aRA + α2aINS + α3aWEST + ǫ2a, (3)
RD = α0r + α1rRR + α2rINS + α3rWEST + ǫ2r. (4)
The endogeneity of resource dependence may be the result of the positive
association with resource abundance caused by comparative advantage, but
also of the negative inﬂuence of institutional quality, which might aﬀect re-
source dependence by reducing the enthusiasm of investing and developing
7industrial or services sectors. If any of α1a, α1r, α2a, or α2r is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, this would be an indication that it is appropriate to treat
resource dependence as endogenous.
Our main purpose is to study the eﬀects of resource abundance on eco-
nomic growth. To incorporate direct and indirect eﬀects of resource abun-
dance/rents through the channel of either resource dependence or institu-
tional quality, we consider the model
y = γ0a + γ1aRA + γ2aRD + γ3aINS +
6  
k=1
θkaxk + ǫ3a, (5)
y = γ0r + γ1rRR + γ2rRD + γ3rINS +
6  
k=1
θkrxk + ǫ3r, (6)








contain auxiliary control variables: education (EDU), industrial develop-
ment (IND), entrepreneurship (ENT), openness (OPEN), initial economy
level (INIT), and the Western dummy (WEST). In Equations (5) and (6),
γ1a and γ1r measure the direct eﬀect of resource abundance, γ2a and γ2r the
indirect eﬀect through resource dependence, and γ3a and γ3r the indirect
eﬀect through institutional quality. The auxiliary variables aﬀect the econ-
omy and are associated with resource abundance, and their inclusion will
therefore reduce omitted variable bias. Education reﬂects investment in hu-
man capital, which is not much required in the primary sector. Therefore,
resource abundance might undermine the incentives to invest in human cap-
ital, thus resulting in lower economic growth. Entrepreneurship stimulates
innovation and hence the economy, but it might be ‘squeezed out’ by resource
abundance (Sachs and Warner, 2001). Similarly, industrial development is
included, since the ‘Dutch disease’ eﬀect implies that industry is likely to be
crowded out by the resource in regions rich in resource. Openness may be
important, because the more a province enjoys resource abundance, the more
self-suﬃcient it will be, and therefore the less likely to be open. Initial state
of economy is necessary for capturing the long-run eﬀect of resource. Finally,
the West dummy controls the remarkable diﬀerence between the economies
of Western and Eastern regions.
83 Data and descriptive statistics
We consider 28 ‘provinces’ in China, namely 22 provinces, 4 municipalities
directly under the Central Government, and 2 autonomous regions. We refer
to all 28 ‘provinces’ as provinces. Only inland provinces are considered, and
hence Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan are not included. Three autonomous
regions (Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet) are excluded because of lack
of data. Each province is labeled either ‘West’ or ‘East’, depending on its
geographic location; see Figure 1.
[Figure 1]
The measurement of resource abundance (RA) in China is typically based
on resource rents (RR) (Zhang et al., 2008). However, resource abundance
is not the same as resource rents, since RA measures the stock of resource
reserves while RR measures the production of resources at speciﬁc points
in time. In addition, measures of resource abundance typically only cover
energy resources, but do not take into account the equally important mineral
resources. In this paper, resource abundance is measured by the resource
reserve explored and surveyed in 2003–2004, and it covers both energy and
the most important mineral resources. There are no data on resource reserves
in the China Statistical Yearbook (National Bureau of Statistics) until 2003.
Since it is not likely that resource reserves vary greatly across years (as can
be veriﬁed by comparing the reported statistics from 2003 to 2008), it seems
reasonable to use the reserves rather than the production as a measure of
resource abundance. For the purpose of comparison and in order to allow
robustness checks, we shall report on both measurement concepts, hence not
only RA but also the more common RR based on energy resource production.
The economy-related variables include economic growth, institutional
quality, education, industrial development, entrepreneurship, openness, ini-
tial economic level, and investment in ﬁxed assets. All of these, except in-
stitutional quality and initial economic level, contain observations in several
years for each province. The time span varies across variables.
We emphasize the inclusion of institutional quality. This is a diﬃcult
concept to measure, and is therefore often ignored or measured using dubi-
ous proxies, such as the ratio of total trade over GDP; see Xu and Wang
(2006) and Shao and Qi (2009). We propose to use the conﬁdence in courts
surveyed in 1995 by the World Bank as a measure of institutional quality.
These data are at city level. To construct the provincial level data, we take a
weighted average of all cities in one province where the weights are given by
the proportion of the city’s GDP in the province. This is clearly a subjective
measure and can be biased, as pointed out by Olken (2009) in a diﬀerent
9context. Still, we believe that conﬁdence in courts is a better proxy to in-
stitutional quality than other proxies used in the literature. In addition,
since we work with aggregated provincial data, the bias (if present) would
be averaged out to some extent.
The resource reserve data come from the China Statistical Yearbook (Na-
tional Bureau of Statistics). Resource rents and resource dependence data
are available from the China Economic Information Network (CEINET). The
economy-related variables are either from CEINET or from the World Bank.
The measurement of all variables and their time span are described below.
Growth Growth of real GDP per capita. In the cross-section analysis,





where T = 2008 and T0 = 1990. In the panel-data analysis, it is deﬁned
as the annual growth rate of real GDP per capita:
Growtht = log(GDPt/GDPt−1) (t = 1991,...,2008).
RR Resource rents, measured by natural energy resource production, a com-
bination of the production of raw coal, crude oil, and natural gas, calcu-
lated as suggested by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (Xu and Wang,
2006):
RR (in tons) = coal production (in tons) × 0.714
+ oil production (in tons) × 1.43
+ gas production (in 1000m
3) × 1.33.
The time spans from 1989 to 2008. Some authors include, besides coal,
oil, and gas, also hydro-electric power (Zhang et al., 2008), electric
power, or nuclear power (Shao and Qi, 2009). We restrict ourselves to
the primary energy sources (coal, oil, gas), because electric and nuclear
power are more related to human activity than to natural resources.
RA Resource abundance, constructed by multiplying resource reserves by
their average market prices in 2004. The resource reserves cover petro-
leum, natural gas, coal, iron ore, manganese ore, copper ore, lead mine,
zinc ore, and bauxite, explored in 2003 or 2004. Energy resource data
are from 2003, while mineral resource data are from 2004 due to many
missing values in 2003. The energy resource data in 2003 and 2004 are
very similar. The market prices are obtained from Worldwide Mining
Business Website (http://www.wdore.com).
10RD Resource dependence, the ratio of ﬁxed asset investment in the mining
industry over all ﬁxed asset investment. The time span is from 1996
to 2008.
INS Institutional quality, measured by conﬁdence in courts, which is a
weighted average of city level data. Only cross-section data in 1995
are available.
EDU Education, the number of teachers as a proportion of provincial pop-
ulation, from 1989 to 2008. The number of teachers is obtained as the
sum of all teachers in university, middle school, and elementary school.
IND Industrial development, ratio of value-added of industry to GDP, from
1992 to 2008.
ENT Entrepreneurship, also referred as private economic activity, measured
by the number of people in non-state-owned companies divided by the
provincial population, from 1992 to 2008. Employees in non-state-
owned companies work either in private-owned companies or in self-
employed households.
OPEN Openness, the ratio of actual inﬂow of foreign investment over gross
investment in ﬁxed assets, from 1989 to 2003.
INIT Initial economic level, deﬁned as the logarithm of real GDP per capita
in 1989.
INV Total investment in ﬁxed assets, averaged over 1974 to 1989, used as
an instrumental variable for resource dependence.
WEST Geographic dummy: WEST = 1 if the province lies in the Western
region of China (as deﬁned in Figure 1) and WEST = 0 otherwise.
DIS Distance to coast, deﬁned as the distance from the provincial capital
to the nearest harbor (source: Au and Henderson (2006)).
The last two variables are geographic rather than economy-related. Distance
to coast (DIS) is sometimes used as an instrumental variable for institu-
tional quality, based on the idea that coastal regions are typically more open
than inland regions, and thus require higher institutional quality. More im-
portantly, coastal regions in China enjoy preferential policies compared to
inland regions.
[Table 1]
11The 28 provinces are compared in Table 1 in terms of resource production, re-
source reserves, and resource dependence. As expected, resource production
and resource reserves are highly correlated, although the provinces Shang-
dong, Heilongjiang, and Yunan are exceptions. In particular, Shangdong and
Heilongjiang are among the top 3 in terms of resource production but they
rank only 9 and 11 in terms of resource reserves. The reason is that these two
provinces are especially rich in energy resources like oil and coal, but rela-
tively poor in other mineral resources. Yunan province is among the top 10 in
terms of resource reserves but ranks only 12 in terms of resource production.
This is partly because Yunan province is famous for its rich mineral resources
such as manganese ore, lead ore, and zinc ore, but more importantly because
its resources are not fully exploited due to poor exploitation techniques and
conditions, complex geological structure, and low economic coal reserves.
(We note that Yunan is among the top 5 in terms of coal reserves, but that
its coal production is quite low compared to its reserves.) Tianjin province is
classiﬁed as resource-scarce according to resource reserves, although its en-
ergy production is relatively high. In fact, although Tianjin has few mineral
resources, its surrounding sea produces a large amount of oil.
As for resource dependence, it is clear that provinces with low resource
production generally show weak resource dependence. However, not all pro-
vinces with a high degree of resource dependence are associated with large
resource production, for example Qinghai and Ningxia. On the other hand,
some provinces (like Shandong) produce much resources but do not seem to
be dependent on it. Both Qinghai and Ningxia are poor provinces, while
Shandong is well-developed, and hence one might think that it is the high
resource dependence rather than the abundant resource that curses the econ-
omy. Further investigation is required, however, before we can draw such
conclusions.
[Table 2]
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the economy-related variables. By
comparing the statistics of the East sample and the West sample, we see that
the average growth rate in Eastern provinces is generally higher than in the
Western provinces. On the other hand, Western provinces have relatively
higher resource abundance, resource rents, and resource dependence than
Eastern provinces, which suggests the possible existence of a resource curse
in China.
[Figure 2]
To gain further insight we present a scatter plot and simple regression ﬁts
of the growth rate against resource abundance and resource dependence, re-
12spectively, in Figure 2. From these plots it becomes clear that the average
resource production in Western provinces is greatly aﬀected by Shanxi pro-
vince, where resource plays a remarkable role. The last two columns in Ta-
ble 2 present descriptive statistics of the Western provinces without Shanxi,
and we see that it is now not so clear whether resource abundance, resource
rents, and resource dependence are higher in Western provinces than in the
East. Although resource abundance is still higher in Western than in East-
ern regions, the Western regions also have larger standard errors. A simple
regression ﬁt shows a downward slope of the growth rate against resource
dependence in the right panel of Figure 2. However, the correlation between
growth rate and resource abundance is positive even when Shanxi province
is included.
As for auxiliary control variables, a comparison between East sample
and West sample shows that the Eastern region is more developed than the
Western region in the sense of better institutional quality, higher education
level, more ﬂourishing industry, more entrepreneurs, and higher degree of
openness. For the auxiliary variables, there is not much diﬀerence whether
we include Shanxi province or not, which supports the classiﬁcation of Shanxi
province as a Western province.
In the following, we ﬁrst perform cross-section analysis using data aver-
aged across years. By using the averaged data, cross-section analysis reduces
the possible bias caused by economic ﬂuctuations. Since Chongqing is a mu-
nicipality directly under the Central Government since 1997, all variables
(and the average) for Chongqing are documented after 1997. For provinces
with missing values in some years, averages are taken over the years with
observations.
4 Cross-section analysis
We examine the resource curse by estimating Equations (1)–(6) using the
cross-section data, that is, the data averaged over the whole time period.
[Table 3]
In Table 3 we present the relations between resource abundance, resource de-
pendence, and institutional quality. In Equations (1) and (2), institutional
quality is regressed on resource abundance/rents and resource dependence
while controlling for geography (West dummy). The results in columns (a)
and (b) show that both resource abundance and resource rents are positively
(and signiﬁcantly) correlated with institutional quality. This may be caused
13by the fact that a resource boom has an income eﬀect, leading to an improve-
ment in the quality of institutions. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) list
several possible transmission mechanisms between income and institutional
quality (see also Barro (1996), Acemoglu et al. (2005), and Przeworski and
Limongi (1993)). Although both estimates are ‘signiﬁcant’, resource rents
is more strongly related with institutional quality than resource abundance.
This is to be expected, since the deﬁnition of resource rents implies that it is
closely correlated with income. Resource dependence, on the other hand, is
negatively correlated with institutional quality. One possible explanation of
this negative correlation is the rent-seeking hypothesis, which suggests that
local governments are more corrupt in resource-abundant regions (Jensen
and Wantchekon, 2004). But Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) point out
that an opposite eﬀect may exist, that is, from institutional quality on re-
source dependence. Since resource dependence is signiﬁcant when explaining
institutional quality (columns (a) and (b)), but institutional quality does
not play a signiﬁcant role in explaining resource dependence (columns (c.1)–
(d.2)), the transmission from institutional quality to resource dependence is
not obvious in the case of China. Finally, the West dummy is signiﬁcantly
negative, conﬁrming that there does exist a diﬀerence in institutional quality
between the East and the West of China.
In Equations (3) and (4) we regress resource dependence on resource
abundance/rents, institutional quality, and investment in ﬁxed assets. Here
we try to explore the endogeneity of resource dependence. In columns (c.1)
and (d.1) the equations are estimated using OLS; in columns (c.2) and (d.2)
using 2SLS. The OLS estimates show a strong association between resource
dependence and resource abundance/rents, while institutional quality enters
negatively, but either weakly signiﬁcant or insigniﬁcant. Average total invest-
ment during the 1970s and 1980s (INV) is highly correlated with resource
dependence, thus allowing the possibility of using it as an instrument for
resource dependence. In the 2SLS estimates we have instrumented institu-
tional quality by distance to the coast (DIS). (The validity of this instru-
ment will be discussed shortly.) In general we conclude that both institu-
tional quality and resource dependence are positively inﬂuenced by resource
abundance/rents, and that they are negatively associated with each other.
These results show that in China resource dependence has a negative eﬀect
on institutional quality, while resource abundance has a positive eﬀect, thus
challenging the conventional argument of resource curse on institutional qual-
ity, and partly conﬁrming the ﬁndings in Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008).
Changing from resource abundance to resource rents does not change the
results much, and this suggests that the two variables largely measure the
same concept, and also shows the robustness of our results.
14[Table 4]
Based on the above preliminary analysis, we now turn to the impacts of nat-
ural resources on economic growth, using Equations (5) and (6). The OLS
results are given in Table 4. As a benchmark we present column (a), repre-
senting the classical literature in parsimonious form, where economic growth
is explained by resource dependence, and West dummy and initial economy
serve as controls. This regression shows a negative (but insigniﬁcant) coeﬃ-
cient of resource dependence, and a signiﬁcant West dummy. The conclusion
from column (a) would be that a resource curse exists, but this conclusion
would be too simplistic as we shall see. If we include not only resource
dependence but also resource abundance as explanatory variables, then we
obtain diﬀerent results. In columns (b) and (c), we see a positive (strongly
signiﬁcant) impact of resource abundance and rents, and a negative (weakly
signiﬁcant) impact of resource dependence. As expected, the West dummy
has a negative (and signiﬁcant) impact as well. Columns (d) and (e) include
institutional quality as an additional explanatory variable. This reduces the
signiﬁcance of resource abundance, resource rents, and resource dependence.
If we include more controls (education, industrialization, entrepreneurship,
and openness), as we do in columns (f) and (g), then the signiﬁcance of our
estimates is further reduced.
We draw four conclusions from these estimates. First, resource abun-
dance and resource rents seem to measure the same concept when applied
to growth regressions in China. Most Chinese provinces with rich natural
resources make full and exhaustive use of these resources. Abundant nat-
ural resources are therefore strongly associated with resource rents, which
explains their near-equivalence. Second, a positive eﬀect of resource abun-
dance and rents on economic performance in columns (b)–(g) challenges the
existence of a resource curse. On the contrary, it supports the argument that
resource abundance plays an active role in promoting economic growth; see
also Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008). One explanation of this positive role
of resource abundance is the ‘windfall’ ﬂow of income from resource extrac-
tion, which has a direct eﬀect on the economy as well as an indirect eﬀect
through improving institutional quality. Third, we ﬁnd that resource depen-
dence exerts a negative (weakly signiﬁcant) inﬂuence on growth in China.
This negative impact can be interpreted as a ‘crowding-out’ eﬀect, in the
sense that overemphasis on resource-related sectors crowds out the economic
activity in other sectors such as education, industry, and entrepreneurship,
thus impeding economic growth. The existence of such a ‘crowding-out’ ef-
fect follows from the fact that including EDU, IND, ENT, and OPEN in the
regressions reduces the impact of resource dependence, while the eﬀects of
15the controls themselves are positive (and signiﬁcant, except for EDU). In this
respect, our results bridge Brunnschweiler and Bulte’s (2008) argument and
the conventional ‘resource curse’ view. Finally, we emphasize the remarkable
role of institutional quality. Its inclusion has a large eﬀect on the signiﬁcance
of resource-related variables and the West dummy, and it has a strong as-
sociation with the economic performance. More investigation on the role of
institutional quality is provided in the next section.
[Table 5]
Before further examining the relations between institutional quality, natural
resources, and economic growth, we ask whether the presence of endogene-
ity, which would render OLS inconsistent, is a problem in our set-up. Two
variables may be endogenous: resource dependence and institutional quality.
Resource dependence would be endogenous because the denominator of this
variable, ﬁxed asset investment, is associated with the size of the economy.
The possible endogeneity of institutional quality has been widely studied
in the growth literature (e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2005)). Thus, we introduce
instruments, and this leads to Table 5. The regressions (f.1), (g.1), (f.2),
and (g.2) are estimated by instrumenting resource dependence with resource
abundance (RA in (f.1) and (f.2), RR in (g.1) and (g.2)) and total investment
in ﬁxed assets (INV); the remaining two regressions use the distance to coast
(DIS) as instrument for institutional quality. The IV estimates generally
agree with the OLS estimates showing that, without including institutional
quality and other controls, resource abundance and rents are positively cor-
related with growth while resource dependence has a negative correlation.
Also, if we include institutional quality and other controls, then these re-
lations become less signiﬁcant, while the eﬀects of most of the controls are
signiﬁcant. The main diﬀerence between the OLS and IV estimates is that
the signiﬁcance of the resource variables is weaker when instruments are used.
The Shea partial R2, ﬁrst-stage F-statistic, and weak identiﬁcation test all
indicate that resource dependence is strongly correlated with its correspond-
ing instruments, and the Sargan test implies that the exogeneity condition
is satisﬁed for these instruments, which also conﬁrms the exogeneity of our
resource abundance measure. In contrast, the instrument of institutional
quality turns out to be poor. The geographic factor (‘distance to the coast’
in our case) as an instrumental variable is clearly predetermined with respect
to the error term. However, as also pointed out by Brock and Durlauf (2001),
predetermination does not necessarily imply exogeneity. Therefore, distance
to the coast might not be a valid instrument. In particular, we could imag-
ine that distance to the coast aﬀects economic growth through other factors
besides institutional quality. For example, provinces closer to the coast may
16be characterized by a more open culture and the industrial structure would
also be more export-oriented, both of which may lead to higher economic
growth. This explains, in part, why distance to the coast does not serve
as a good instrument in our case. The results when using this instrument
(columns (f.3) and (g.3)) show a negative impact of resource abundance and
a positive impact of resource dependence (although not signiﬁcant), which
diﬀers from our previous ﬁndings, but these results should be treated with
some caution.
[Table 6]
Table 6 presents the results of 3SLS estimation, in which two endogenous
variables (resource dependence and institutional quality) are simultaneously
instrumented (Davidson and Mackinnon, 1993). The estimation results are
similar to the OLS and 2SLS estimates. In particular, since institutional
quality is controlled and instrumented, neither the coeﬃcients of resource
abundance and rents nor of resource dependence are signiﬁcant.
5 Institutional quality and the relation be-
tween RA and RD
We have seen that resource abundance and rents have a positive impact on
economic growth, while resource dependence has a negative impact. Table 3,
columns (a) and (b), also shows that abundance and dependence have a
signiﬁcant conﬂicting eﬀect on institutional quality. These opposite eﬀects
are puzzling. What role does natural resource play in aﬀecting the economy
of Chinese provinces? More specially, since resource dependence is highly
correlated with resource abundance/rents (Table 3) and their eﬀects on eco-
nomic growth are conﬂicting, when do abundant natural resources help and
when do they hinder regional development? Also, under what conditions do
the positive eﬀects of resource abundance/rents dominate and under what
conditions do the negative eﬀects of resource dependence dominate?
All these questions can be answered if we associate resource abundance/rents
and resource dependence with institutional quality. Our preliminary analysis
has already provided evidence about the importance of institutional quality
in explaining the variation of Chinese provincial economies. Institutional
quality is positively related with resource abundance/rents, but negatively
with resource dependence, and it appears to be a transmission channel from
resource to economic growth, while also serving as a catalyst in economic
growth. In addition, institutional quality plays a vital role in the relation
17between resource abundance/rents and resource dependence. In particular,
the prosperity of many non-resource sectors is largely built on good institu-
tional quality. Beck and Levine (2005) associated institutions with thrive in
ﬁnancial sectors, since good institutions lead to more willingness of savers
to invest in ﬁrms, and a higher eﬀectiveness of corporate governance. Nunn
(2007) pointed out that better contract enforcement makes countries more
specialized in the industries in which so-called relationship-speciﬁc invest-
ments play dominant roles. In this sense, provinces with poor institutional
quality are supposed to lean on the existing resource to a higher degree. To
examine whether such moderation eﬀects exist in our case, we regress re-
source dependence on resource abundance and resource rents, respectively,
while allowing the coeﬃcients to be functions of institutional quality. By do-
ing so, we capture how the inﬂuence of resource abundance/rents on resource
dependence varies over diﬀerent levels of institutional quality. We consider
the functional-coeﬃcient regression models
RD = δ0a + δ1aRA + δ2aINV + ηa, (7)
RD = δ0r + δ1rRR + δ2rINV + ηr, (8)
where the coeﬃcients δ1a and δ1r are functions of institutional quality. The
advantage of a functional-coeﬃcient model over a model with an interaction
term is that the latter can only report a positive or negative eﬀect of institu-
tional quality (the same value for all institutional quality levels), while the
former provides information on how such an eﬀect varies across diﬀerent lev-
els of institutional quality. The varying eﬀect is important because it is not
only institutional quality but also the eﬀect of institutional quality that is
likely to vary across provinces. In ‘well-organized’ provinces the eﬀect will be
higher than in less well-organized provinces. The parameters in this model
are estimated non-parametrically by local linear estimation (Cai et al., 2000),
where various data-driven methods could be employed for selecting smooth-
ing variables, such as AIC, cross-validation, explanatory variables (Cai et al.,
2000), and linear function of explanatory variables (Fan et al., 2003). Robust-
ness checks show that the selection of smoothing variables does not change
the main results.
[Figure 3]
In Figure 3 we show how the δ1-parameter changes as a function of insti-
tutional quality. The typical ‘U-shape’ in both subﬁgures shows strong cor-
relation between resource abundance and resource dependence in provinces
with poor institutional quality. Resource-abundant provinces rely much on
their abundant resource, and are therefore highly resource-dependent. As
18the institutional quality improves, the dependence decreases. This is intu-
itive because sectors that are highly dependent on institutional quality (e.g.,
ﬁnancial sectors) cannot develop in provinces with poor institutional quality,
and therefore these provinces have to rely more on their primary industries
(e.g., resource sectors). For example, Shaanxi, Heilongjiang, Guizhou, and
Ningxia provinces all have relatively low institutional quality, and therefore
their economies largely depend on resource abundance, while non-resource
sectors are poorly developed, see Table 1. Improvement of institutional qual-
ity helps the development of some non-resource sectors, thus generating less
dependence on natural resources.
It is less intuitive, however, that provinces with especially strong in-
stitutional quality also exhibit high positive correlation between resource
abundance and resource dependence. One possible explanation is that some
of these provinces lack natural resources, and are thus hardly resource-
dependent. The strong institutional quality is then explained either by their
geography (near the coast or near an important river) or by some governmen-
tal policy (preferential treatment). Typical examples are Shanghai, Zhejiang,
and Fujian provinces, all in Eastern China. Another possible explanation is
that if provinces with high institutional quality are rich in natural resources,
they are likely to make good use of these abundant resources. High resource
dependence then does not crowd out non-resource sectors. Instead, non-
resource sectors are stimulated by a combination of good institutional quality
and good use of natural resources. Examples include Shandong, Jilin, Liaon-
ing, Tianjin, and Henan provinces, most of which are traditional industrial
provinces in North-East China. These provinces are rich in natural resources,
especially mineral resources. Under high institutional quality, they properly
exploit and eﬃciently use the resources. Thus, booms in resource sectors do
not impede the development of non-resource sectors, but instead stimulate
industries that are indirectly related with resources such as the automobile
industry, shipbuilding industry, and equipment manufacturing industry. To
test this hypothesis, we re-estimate the growth regressions, now allowing the
coeﬃcients to vary across institutional quality.
[Figure 4]
The results are shown in Figure 4. When institutional quality exceeds the
median level, the negative impact of resource dependence on economic growth
is weakened as institutional quality improves. Similar behavior is observed
in the relation between resource abundance and economic growth. These
results make good sense in the Chinese situation. Property rights on nat-
ural resources in China are owned by the government, and local residents
19therefore typically do not beneﬁt much from rents derived from resource ex-
traction (Zhang et al., 2008). Most income associated with resources goes to
the government and state-owned enterprizes. Hence, for provinces poor in
institutional quality, rising rents from the booming resource sectors are not
used by the government to stimulate the economy, but often harm economic
development, because they lead to increased prices for non-tradable goods
and hurt the competitiveness of local economies (Zhang et al., 2008). On
the other hand, if institutional quality is strong, rents from resources may be
used in boosting the economic development, because better property rights
result in higher growth by means of improving asset allocation (Claessens
and Laeven, 2003).
We also note some less intuitive evidence. For provinces with institu-
tional quality below the median, the resource-dependence eﬀect on economic
growth changes from positive to negative, as institutional quality increases.
This is because in provinces where institutional quality is really poor, almost
no non-resource sectors exist, and therefore resource sectors, as the ‘only’
industry, play a positive role in economic growth. An increase in institu-
tional quality leads to the development of other industries, and thus weakens
the dominance of the resource industry. As institutional quality increases
further, the negative impact of resource dependence on growth reﬂects the
‘resource curse’ due to the crowding-out eﬀect, which is the consensus view
in the literature. But, as explained above, when the institutional quality
increases even further, this crowding-out eﬀect is weakened. We conclude
and, to some extent, explain that resource abundance has a high positive
correlation with resource dependence in provinces with extreme (very strong
or very poor) institutional quality, that the eﬀect of resources on the econ-
omy is highly dependent on institutional quality, and, more generally, that
institutional quality plays a prominent part in the economy.
Although our study only considers China, this relation between resource
abundance, resource dependence, and institutional quality may hold more
generally. Countries with abundant resources but poor economic perfor-
mance are often characterized by poor institutional quality (Zambia, Guyana,
Mauritius), and these countries are also highly resource-dependent with un-
derdeveloped non-resource sectors. In contrast, countries with abundant re-
sources and a prosperous economy mostly have high institutional quality
(Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway), and both resource and non-
resource sectors are well-developed.
206 Cross section with a structural break
During the observed period 1989–2008, the Chinese economy experienced a
signiﬁcant event in the year 2000, when the central government proposed the
‘West China Development Drive’, designed to stimulate the economy of the
Western regions. Since then, preferential policies for investment, education,
and industry have been implemented, and these have resulted in more pros-
perity in the Western regions. Natural resources might play a diﬀerent role
before and after the policy change in 2000, and we investigate this in the
current section.
[Figure 5]
We see from Figure 5 that real GDP per capita in the Western region de-
veloped quite diﬀerently in the two periods, with a spectacular increase af-
ter 2001. Some provinces, such as Shaanxi province, Ningxia Autonomous
Region and Qinghai province, grow even faster than some of the Eastern
regions. Value-added also increased sharply after 2002, and so did resource
production. Apparently, the West China Development Drive has caused a
faster-developing economy, considerable growth in resource production, and
an acceleration in industrialization in the Western regions. It is of interest,
therefore, to study whether this policy change has aﬀected the resource eﬀect.
We ﬁrst re-estimate the growth regressions (5) and (6) with cross-section
data in the two periods, respectively. Thus, we divide the sample in two
periods: before and after 2000. All economy-related variables are averaged
over these two periods, respectively. We only consider resource rents, because
resource abundance is a stock measure of resource reserve that does not vary
much over time, and also because resource rents are a more direct reﬂection
of income from extracting resources and they do vary over time. Since the
data on institutional quality come from a one-year survey, which have no
values after 2000, we can not include institutional quality in this compara-
tive analysis. Even though, a pre- and post-break comparison allows some
important insights.
[Table 7]
Table 7 presents the pre- and post-break comparison of resource eﬀects. We
see that the resource eﬀect does not change much between the two periods
at an averaged level. In particular, resource rents play a positive role in both
periods. After introducing more explanatory variables and instruments, the
eﬀect of resource rents becomes insigniﬁcant. The eﬀect of resource depen-
dence is strongly signiﬁcant and negative before 2000 in the OLS regression
21without additional controls. After including additional controls, the resource
dependence eﬀect becomes insigniﬁcant. Instrumental variable estimation
results in a positive but also insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient of resource dependence.
Resource dependence is insigniﬁcant in all after-2000 regressions. As for the
auxiliary control variables, most are signiﬁcant before 2000 except for IND,
ENT, and INIT, but only EDU remains signiﬁcant after 2000 (column (e)).
However, EDU switches from negative (and signiﬁcant) to positive (and sig-
niﬁcant), hence a great change from before to after the break. The West
dummy is negative (and signiﬁcant) before 2000, but after 2000 it becomes
positive (and weakly signiﬁcant). Hence, Western provinces grew at a lower
rate than the Eastern provinces before 2000, but on average their growth
rates exceed those of the East after 2000.
7 Panel data with time-varying coeﬃcients
Although we have just seen that there seems to be no remarkable change
of resource eﬀects between the two periods before and after 2000, we can
not yet draw a ﬁrm conclusion because our results are only based on aver-
aged data and therefore contain no information about dynamics. In addition,
we have only a small number of provinces. These problems can be largely
overcome by using panel data. There are at least three advantages in using
panel data. First, by incorporating not only variation in provinces but also
in time, we are able to capture the dynamic behavior of the resource eﬀect
as well as other impacts on economic performance. Second, since the sample
size is much enlarged, the accuracy of the estimates will be much better.
Third, the panel-data approach allows us to incorporate heterogeneity, at
least partially. It is not plausible to assume that the parameters of growth
determinants are identical across provinces, especially for a big country like
China. Although the functional-coeﬃcient model considered above addresses
this problem by allowing coeﬃcients to depend on institutional quality, unob-
served province-speciﬁc determinants still remain. Panel data models allow
for province heterogeneity by including a ﬁxed eﬀect. This does not fully
address the heterogeneity problem and the approach may suﬀer from limited
time-dimension variation (Brock and Durlauf, 2001), but one would expect
to gain useful additional information on the eﬀects of growth determinants,
especially on the time-varying features. Due to the limitation of data in some
provinces in the early years, we focus on the period 1997–2007. For the same
reason (see also Section 6), we do not take into account resource abundance
(but only resource rents) and institutional quality in the panel-data models.
Our coeﬃcients will be time-varying, in the same spirit as in the functional-
22coeﬃcient model. This model allows us to gain some insights on how resource
eﬀects change annually. The time-varying coeﬃcients panel-data model can
be written as
yit = ci + x
′
itβ(t) + ǫit (i = 1,...,N, t = 1,...,T), (9)
where yit denotes the growth rate of real GDP per capita in province i at
year t, ci is a province-speciﬁc eﬀect, and xit are the independent variables,
that is, YEAR, RR, RD, EDU, IND, ENT, and OPEN, all in province i
and at year t. The idiosyncratic error is denoted ǫit and it is assumed to be
independent of xit.
Unlike the cross-section analysis, initial economy level and West dummy
are not included as explanatory variables here. This is because the panel-
data model focuses on short-run dynamics, so that the initial state need not
be controlled, and also because we employ a ﬁrst-diﬀerence (FD) estimation
method, as commonly used in such models, and therefore coeﬃcients of time-
invariant variables cannot be identiﬁed. Because of the same identiﬁcation
problem, no intercept appears in the regressions. The variable YEAR cap-
tures the time eﬀect. In Equation (9), β(t) = {β1(t),β2(t),...,βk(t)}′ are
the coeﬃcients for the k control variables, all of which are smooth functions
of t.
Preliminary analysis suggests that unobserved heterogeneity ci among
provinces is correlated with the regressors. This is what one would expect
since unobserved heterogeneity, like diﬀerences in natural characteristics and
human-induced social formation among provinces, is reﬂected in education,
industrialization, openness, and so on, and therefore causes correlation with
the regressors. For this reason, FD (or ﬁxed-eﬀects) estimators are more ap-
propriate than pooled OLS or random-eﬀects estimators. To implement the
FD estimation, a ﬁrst-diﬀerence transformation is made. Based on Hoover
et al. (1998), the local polynomial estimator of ˆ βl(t) for each l ∈ {1,...,k}





with d ≥ 1 but ﬁnite. This can be done by minimizing an appropriately
locally weighted sum of squares. We estimate the coeﬃcients using a special
case of the local polynomial estimator with d = 1, that is, a local constant
ﬁt in which the weight is selected as the kernel function K ((t − t0)/h) with
bandwidth h. In this case, the estimated coeﬃcient can be obtained by




























Several methods exist to select the bandwidth. We follow Hoover et al.
(1998) and choose the bandwidth by minimizing average predictive squared
error calculated with ‘leave-one-out’ cross-validation.
The remaining issue is how to tackle the endogeneity problem in the cur-
rent panel-data setting. In contrast to the cross-section model, INV can
not be used as an instrument now since it is time-invariant. Hence, other
time-varying variables should be selected as an instrument for resource de-
pendence. An obvious choice are lagged variables, and thus we include the
ﬁrst-order lag of resource dependence. To keep the estimation procedure
simple, but without losing much explanatory power, only one instrument is
used so that no over-identiﬁcation problem arises. Instead of Equation (10),
















where Zi = (YEARi,RRi,LagRDi,EDUi,INDi,ENTi,OPENi)
′.
Based on Equation (10) we present Figure 6 for the entire sample. The
solid lines represent the estimated time-varying coeﬃcients, and the dashed
lines are conﬁdence bounds based on bootstrap standard errors (calculated
with 400 replications). The conﬁdence bounds may not be completely accu-
rate since smoothing bias is not taken into account. The dependent variable
is real GDP growth rate per capita.
[Figure 6]
All coeﬃcients vary over time. The coeﬃcient of resource rents is negative
in the period 1998–2000; positive and increasing from 2001–2004; and de-
creasing and negative from 2005–2007. The time-varying estimates do not
contradict the previous cross-section comparative analysis. In the period be-
fore 2000 the impact of resource rents was less stable, and this is reﬂected
in weak signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient in the cross-section analysis (see Ta-
ble 7, column (b)). In contrast, in the period after 2000, the impact is more
signiﬁcant. Although the impact becomes negative after 2005, this does not
oﬀset the positiveness during 2001 to 2004, which is in accordance with the
24signiﬁcant and positive coeﬃcient in the cross-section analysis (Table 7, col-
umn (e)). The coeﬃcient of resource dependence is approximately zero un-
til 2000; increases from 2000–2004; and then shows a ‘U-shape’. This is also
in line with the cross-section analysis: an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient before 2000
in the cross-section analysis is reﬂected by estimates around zero in the time-
varying model, while an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient after 2000 is due to the oﬀset
of positiveness during 2000–2004 and negativeness during 2005–2006. The
estimated time-varying estimates of the other explanatory variables are also
in line with the results in the cross-section comparative analysis (except for
EDU), and the bootstrap band shows that these results are strong.
[Figure 7]
Based on Equation (11), we present the IV estimates in Figure 7, again
for the entire sample. Although these estimates deviate from the above
results to some extent, they show similar behavior for the resource and other
explanatory variables.
[Figure 8] [Figure 9]
To gain further insight into the inﬂuence of the West China Development
Drive policy, we study the resource eﬀects in the Western and Eastern pro-
vinces separately. Since IV estimation gives very large standard errors when
the sample size is small (and the conclusions are not aﬀected), only the time-
varying estimates based on Equation (10) are reported in Figures 8 and 9.
Using only the West sample is very similar to using the entire sample. But
the estimates of some variables using the East sample are not the same as
using the entire sample. Both the resource rent eﬀect and the resource de-
pendence eﬀect are uncertain with large standard errors compared to the
entire-sample and West-sample estimates. Still, resource dependence gener-
ally exerts a positive inﬂuence on economic growth. Since Eastern provinces
generally enjoy high institutional quality, such evidence supports the argu-
ment that large resource dependence might stimulate the economy in regions
with good institutions. The very large standard error for openness after
2005 in both samples is due to the fact that data for this variable are missing
during those years.
The implications of these results are summarized as follows. The eﬀect of
resource rents has indeed changed after the West China Development Drive.
Since the Drive had an emphasis on natural resources, the resources in the
Western provinces were exploited more intensively and used more eﬃciently.
As a result, the income in these regions increased, stimulating economic
growth, although not equally for all regions. As an example, let us consider
25Qinghai and Sichuan provinces. These two provinces are rich in natural gas,
and since the West-East natural gas transmission project constructed many
pipelines, some resource-scarce regions in the East could use the resources
from these two provinces. The production of natural gas brought consider-
able extra income to these provinces. On the other hand, the positive eﬀect
of resource rents was weakened and even became negative after 2004, while
the eﬀects of other regressors did not increase. This phenomenon reﬂects
the current problems in resource exploitation in China. Although resource
exploitation brought extra income to Western regions, it did not promote the
development of other industries and sectors, which is demonstrated by the
decreasing impacts of education, industrialization, and entrepreneurship in
Western provinces after the policy change. These sectors, regarded as engines
of economic growth, were crowded out by an overemphasis on resource sec-
tors. The reason is again related with institutional quality. In particular, the
policy change in Western provinces mostly resulted in more eﬀorts in extract-
ing resources, thus making these provinces more resource-dependent, but it
did not much improve institutional quality and the development of other in-
dustries. Examples are Ningxia and Gansu provinces, where resource rents
increased signiﬁcantly after 2000, but other sectors like education, industri-
alization, and entrepreneurship did not increase much or even decreased. In
addition, only part of the resource produced by the Western regions was used
to improve the local economy, while most of it was sold cheaply to the East
regions to meet the large demand of energy and resource there. For example,
the most important gas ﬁeld in Sichuan province transmitted more than 70%
of its natural gas to Eastern provinces. This may also explain the decrease
in resource eﬀects. Education appears to be increasingly signiﬁcant in eco-
nomic growth, explaining in part the regional diﬀerences in growth patterns
between East and West. In summary, the intensiﬁcation of resource exploita-
tion in the Western provinces went against its original purpose, and further
enlarged the gap between East- and West-China.
8 Conclusions
Four conclusions emerge. First, institutional quality appears to be highly
correlated with both resource abundance and resource dependence. Second,
resource abundance and resource dependence are strongly related, and this
relationship is aﬀected by institutional quality. In provinces with poor insti-
tutional quality, rich resources lead to a high degree of resource dependence,
while for regions with good institutional quality, resource abundance does
not necessarily imply resource dependence. Third, resource abundance and
26resource rents inﬂuence economic growth, and the eﬀects of resource abun-
dance/rents and resource dependence are opposite. Abundant resources con-
tribute to economic development, but overdependence on resources impedes
growth. Fourth, immediately after the 2000 policy shock, resource rents had
a strong positive impact on economic growth. But this eﬀect did not last
long; it decreased and even turned into a negative impact.
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29Figure 1: Map of China
Note: The provinces left of the black solid line are deﬁned as Western regions, most
of which are aﬀected by the ‘West China Development Drive’ policy. More precisely, the
West China Development Drive policy covers Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunan, Tibet,
Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Guangxi. Source: Chi-
nasource website, http://tmdhosting110.com/chsource/site. Although Shanxi province is
usually treated as a central region, it is grouped here as a Western region since its eco-
nomic structure is more like the Western provinces. The same applies to Inner Mongolia,
which is in fact covered by the West China Development Drive policy. Guangxi province
is sometimes grouped as an Eastern region, but since it is included in the West China
Development Drive and has more common with Western regions, it is deﬁned here as a
Western province.
30Figure 2: Relationship between growth and resource




































































































Figure 3: Marginal eﬀect of RA and RR on resource dependence as a function
of institutional quality












































































31Figure 4: Marginal eﬀect of RA and RD on growth as a function of institu-
tional quality






















































































Figure 5: Time-series plot of three economy-related variables in the Western
provinces












Real GDP per capita
Value added of industry
Resource production
Note: The three variables are scaled so that they can be graphed in one picture. In
particular, real GDP per capita is divided by 100, value added of industry is divided
by 10, and resource production is multiplied by 100.
32Figure 6: Time-varying coeﬃcients: entire sample



































































































Note: The solid curve is the estimated coeﬃcient of each regressor, and the two dashed curves represent bootstrap standard error bands.
Such bootstrap bands are not exact conﬁdence intervals since smoothing bias is not taken into account.
3
3Figure 7: Time-varying coeﬃcients: entire sample with instrument on RD















































































Note: The solid curve is the estimated coeﬃcient of each regressor, and the two dashed curves represent bootstrap standard error bands.
Such bootstrap bands are not exact conﬁdence intervals since smoothing bias is not taken into account.
3
4Figure 8: Time-varying coeﬃcients: Western sample











































































Note: The solid curve is the estimated coeﬃcient of each regressor, and the two dashed curves represent bootstrap standard error bands.
Such bootstrap bands are not exact conﬁdence intervals since smoothing bias is not taken into account.
3
5Figure 9: Time-varying coeﬃcients: Eastern sample
































































































Note: The solid curve is the estimated coeﬃcient of each regressor, and the two dashed curves represent bootstrap standard error bands.
Such bootstrap bands are not exact conﬁdence intervals since smoothing bias is not taken into account.
3
6Table 1: Ranking of provinces based on resources
Resource production Resource reserves Resource dependence
Top 10 Bottom 10 Top 10 Bottom 10 Top 10 Bottom 10
Shanxi Hainan Shanxi Shanghai Heilongjiang Beijing
Heilongjiang Shanghai Guizhou Zhejiang Shanxi Zhejiang
Shandong Zhejiang Shaanxi Hainan Qinghai Shanghai
Henan Beijing Henan Tianjin Tianjin Guangdong
Guizhou Qinghai Liaoning Guangdong Shaanxi Fujian
Liaoning Guangxi Hebei Beijing Henan Jiangsu
Hebei Hubei Yunan Fujian Liaoning Hainan
Shaanxi Fujian Anhui Jiangxi Jilin Hubei
Anhui Jiangxi Heilongjiang Hubei Shandong Chongqing
Sichuan Ningxia Sichuan Hunan Ningxia Guangxi
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of economy-related variables
Entire sample East sample West sample West without Shanxi
(28 prov) (18 prov) (10 prov) (9 prov)
Variable Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
Growth 0.0394 0.0054 0.0411 0.0054 0.0364 0.0039 0.0361 0.0040
RR 0.4281 0.6028 0.3615 0.3943 0.5480 0.8784 0.2789 0.2304
RA 241.01 371.61 137.69 168.78 426.99 548.36 264.10 199.45
RD 0.0442 0.0414 0.0376 0.0416 0.0562 0.0402 0.0478 0.0319
INS 58.148 13.072 62.009 11.758 51.199 12.963 50.419 13.499
EDU 0.0085 0.0011 0.0086 0.0010 0.0083 0.0013 0.0081 0.0012
IND 0.2875 0.0665 0.2973 0.0752 0.2698 0.0452 0.2626 0.0414
ENT 0.0655 0.0278 0.0763 0.0283 0.0461 0.0126 0.0460 0.0134
OPEN 0.0963 0.0928 0.1305 0.0991 0.0347 0.0266 0.0354 0.0281
INIT 3.1876 0.2068 3.2626 0.2118 3.0527 0.1100 3.0435 0.1125
37Table 3: Institution, resource dependence, and resource abundance
(a) (b) (c.1) (d.1) (c.2) (d.2)
Dep. Variable INS INS RD RD RD RD
RR 9.3216 0.0428 0.0433
(3.74) (3.34) (4.25)




INS −0.0007 −0.0004 −0.0018 −0.0014
(−1.53) (−0.76) (−1.20) (−0.86)
INV 0.1901 0.2240 0.1937 0.2261
(1.93) (2.59) (1.30) (1.36)
WEST −9.3949 −11.4437
(−2.14) (−2.33)
Constant 64.9893 65.1549 0.0158 −0.0003 0.0794 0.0559
(17.01) (16.91) (0.39) (−0.01) (0.66) (0.42)
Note: The regressions (a)–(d.1) are estimated by OLS; the regressions (c.2) and (d.2)
by 2SLS in which institutional quality is instrumented by distance to coast (DIS).
t-values are in parentheses.
38Table 4: Determinants of economic growth rate: OLS estimation
Growth (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
RR 0.0030 0.0014 0.0008
(3.09) (1.53) (0.69)
RA 4.02e-6 2.37e-6 1.31e-6
(3.40) (1.45) (0.61)
RD −0.0142 −0.0429 −0.0304 −0.0131 −0.0085 −0.0027 −0.0001
(−0.64) (−1.87) (−1.55) (−0.78) (−0.58) (−0.12) (−0.00)
INS 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002









INIT −0.0090 −0.0081 −0.0082 −0.0051 −0.0050 −0.0358 −0.0355
(−1.88) (−1.59) (−1.62) (−1.04) (−1.04) (−4.55) (−4.27)
WEST −0.0063 −0.0061 −0.0070 −0.0038 −0.0042 −0.0009 −0.0011
(−3.01) (−3.07) (−3.53) (−1.36) (−1.45) (−0.27) (−0.32)
Constant 0.0710 0.0680 0.0684 0.0463 0.0455 0.1106 0.1098
(4.48) (4.09) (4.14) (2.41) (2.44) (7.68) (7.63)
Note: t-values are in parentheses.
39Table 5: Determinants of economic growth rate: IV estimation
Growth (f.1) (g.1) (f.2) (g.2) (f.3) (g.3)
RR 0.0024 0.0009 −0.0021
(1.73) (0.77) (−0.25)
RA 3.05e-6 1.27e-6 −7.93e-7
(1.60) (0.73) (−0.12)
RD −0.0289 −0.0132 −0.0051 0.0013 0.0385 0.0164
(−0.79) (−0.41) (−0.15) (0.05) (0.31) (0.30)
INS 0.0002 0.0002 0.0006 0.0004
(3.41) (3.66) (0.52) (0.62)
EDU 1.1688 1.0973 2.7648 2.1788
(1.39) (1.25) (0.56) (0.65)
IND 0.0296 0.0289 0.0248 0.0256
(2.55) (2.52) (1.14) (1.38)
ENT 0.1739 0.1735 0.2158 0.2006
(2.97) (2.88) (1.27) (1.54)
OPEN 0.0316 0.0318 0.0275 0.0290
(3.81) (3.78) (1.95) (2.92)
INIT −0.0083 −0.0084 −0.0358 −0.0355 −0.0354 −0.0353
(−1.89) (−1.97) (−5.69) (−5.32) (−2.42) (−3.13)
WEST −0.0063 −0.0070 −0.0009 −0.0011 0.0042 0.0025
(−3.19) (−3.86) (−0.36) (−0.41) (0.27) (0.21)
Constant 0.0683 0.0685 0.1105 0.1099 0.0700 0.0844
(4.76) (4.93) (9.64) (9.53) (0.65 ) (1.24)
Sargan stat. p-value 0.9121 0.8343 0.8171 0.9177
Weak identiﬁcation test 5.4470 8.4780 3.2050 4.9480 0.1680 0.3140
Shea partial R2 0.4281 0.5721 0.3749 0.4789 0.0070 0.0133
1st stage F-stat. p-value 0.0120 0.0019 0.0659 0.0203 0.6870 0.5822
Note: In the regressions (f.1) and (f.2), resource dependence is instrumented by re-
source abundance (RA) and total investment in ﬁxed assets (INV). In (g.1) and (g.2),
resource dependence is instrumented by resource rents (RR) and total investment in
ﬁxed assets (INV). In (f.3) and (g.4), institutional quality is instrumented by distance
to coast (DIS). Weak identiﬁcation is tested using Kleibergen-Paap’s robust Wald F-
statistic, and employs the critical values from Stock and Yogo (2005). t-values are in
parentheses.
40Table 6: Determinants of economic growth rate: 3SLS estimation






RD −0.2754 −0.1067 −0.0043 0.0056
(−0.69) (−0.44) (−0.05) (0.10)
INS −0.0011 −0.0003 0.0001 0.0002









INIT −0.0529 −0.0351 −0.0362 −0.0358
(−1.51) (−1.33) (−3.53) (−3.83)
WEST −0.0288 −0.0189 −0.0050 −0.0022
(−1.20) (−0.95) (−0.43) (−0.25)
Constant 0.2866 0.1762 0.1318 0.1125
(1.17) (0.98) (1.37) (1.70)
Resource dependence
INV 0.2012 0.2479 0.1584
(1.70) (1.76) (1.59)




INS −0.0008 −0.0001 −0.0015 −0.0009
(−0.76) (−0.99) (−2.02) (−0.98)
Constant 0.0189 −0.0258 0.0728 0.0301
(0.22) (−0.25) (1.14) (0.38)
Institutional quality
DIS −1.0431 −0.9615 −1.0306 −1.0075





Constant 64.776 64.859 64.694 65.150
(16.69) (17.30) (16.87) (17.44)
Note: t-values are in parentheses.
41Table 7: Determinants of economic growth rate: before and after 2000
Before 2000 After 2000
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
RR 0.0048 0.0026 0.0003 0.0057 0.0044 0.0018
(2.13) (1.51) (0.14) (3.13) (2.33) (0.66)
RD −0.0865 −0.0142 0.0259 −0.0262 −0.0813 0.0920
(−3.31) (−0.95) (0.73) (−0.49) (−1.35) (0.81)
EDU −3.2356 −3.8328 3.7008 1.9694
(−4.01) (−5.02) (2.35) (1.05)
IND −0.0014 −0.0053 0.0211 −0.0154
(−0.08) (−0.38) (0.94) (−0.52)
ENT 0.1445 0.1425 0.0265 0.0809
(1.39) (1.61) (0.33) (1.00)
OPEN 0.0420 0.0450 −0.0086 0.0312
(2.11) (2.59) (−0.35) (1.02)
INIT −0.0071 −0.0048 −0.0036 −0.0018 −0.0111 −0.0210
(−0.81) (−0.85) (−0.69) (−0.20) (−0.55) (−0.97)
WEST −0.0110 −0.0065 −0.0070 0.0052 0.0048 0.0042
(−3.77) (−1.81) (−2.34) (1.86) (1.63) (1.45)
Constant 0.0608 0.0652 0.0659 0.0535 0.0459 0.0901
(2.14) (3.78) (4.32) (1.93) (0.95) (1.71)
Note: The regressions (a)–(b) and (d)–(e) are estimated by OLS; the regressions (c)
and (f) by 2SLS with resource dependence instrumented by total investment in ﬁxed
assets (INV). t-values are in parentheses.
42